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WHAT ARE CHINA’S INTENTIONS?

Andrew R. Wilson

Timperlake, Edward, and William Triplett II. Red Dragon
Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1999. 271pp. $27.95
Manning, Robert, Robert Montaperto, and Brad Roberts.
China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000.
91pp. $10

The release of the Cox Committee Report in May 1999 inspired a surge of concern over China’s military modernization, and it heightened anxieties about the
ability of the People’s Republic of China to steal America’s most advanced nuclear weapons technology. While many of the claims made by that committee
have yet to be substantiated, the Cox Report contributed to a fractious debate
about the Clinton administration’s China policy and complicated an already
difficult task of assessing Chinese intentions and capabilities. Moreover, the
worsening of U.S.-China relations that began with the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade and continued through the EP-3 incident earlier this year
convinced many that China would represent the greatest challenge, and perhaps
the greatest threat, to U.S. interests in the twenty-first century.
Both books use the Cox Report as their starting point. Both also offer assessments of Chinese capabilities and intentions as a basis to make policy prescriptions for the new administration. All similarities, however, end there.
Apparently written to capitalize on the public interest created by the Cox
Report, Red Dragon Rising approaches the issues of
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expansionist, nondemocratic superpower armed with the most modern weapons—and it will be the fault of the United States.
Edward Timperlake, a former Marine aviator now on the staff of the House
Committee on Rules, and William Triplett II, the former chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seek to effect a fundamental
change in U.S. China policy—a change that would recognize China as the greatest security threat both to the United States and to the democratic nations of the
world. A litany of China’s arms sales, acts of oppression, and wars of territorial
aggression serves as evidence to support their view. It is odd that a book ostensibly concerned with the future of China and the emerging China threat would
spend so much time discussing the past, but the authors argue that a look at the
“real history” of Chinese brutality and territorial aggression is necessary to
gauge China’s intentions. As a historian of China, I heartily agree with this approach in principle; however, the authors’ claim that they are in possession of
China’s “real history” is problematic. Not only are Timperlake and Triplett’s
discussions of the Tiananmen massacre, the occupation of Tibet, and China’s
foreign wars based on dated scholarship, but they are plagued with factual errors
too numerous to list here, and there is at least one glaring contradiction that undermines their entire argument.
By their own admission it is internal security, the suppression of dissent, and
the military occupation of border regions (such as Tibet) that consume the majority of money, manpower, and attention within the Chinese military. If this is
the case, as the authors claim, how can the People’s Republic also be actively
pursuing hegemonic aspirations throughout Asia? Moreover, as their description of Tibet indicates, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is very aware of the
cost and time commitment necessary to hold even a sparsely populated region
in the face of minimal resistance. This fact would seem to militate against territorial aggrandizement at the expense of China’s neighbors, but Timperlake and
Triplett do not address this critical point.
In terms of military modernization, Red Dragon Rising presents an extreme
view of China’s emerging capabilities. While most of the debate over the Chinese
military arises between those who are skeptical about China’s future military capabilities and those who believe that the PLA will achieve some significant advances, the authors take all Chinese claims at face value. As a result, Timperlake
and Triplett credit the PLA with an across-the-board force modernization and
doctrinal innovation that will rapidly outstrip U.S. ability to respond. Unfortunately, Timperlake and Triplett do not use the abundant open-source material
on the Chinese military to support their dire predictions about the PLA’s ability to develop and master new weapons systems and engage in information
warfare. Nor do the authors make reference to the equally available scholarly
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literature on the significant problems confronting China in terms of its political,
social, and economic cohesion that may constrain military modernization.
Consisting primarily of speculation and innuendo, almost completely bereft
of scholarly merit, seemingly inspired principally by hatred for Bill Clinton and
Al Gore, and wholly loyal to the Taiwan lobby, Red Dragon Rising will be of little
value to readers who are truly interested in serious debate about U.S. policy
toward China. The book’s inflammatory polemics can only serve to politicize
further what the authors correctly identify as an issue of concern to all Americans. Moreover, the desire to list every evil ever perpetrated by the People’s
Republic serves only to obscure the most critical and alarming new trends—the
improvements in China’s nuclear capabilities and its growing strategic partnership with Russia.
While equally concerned with China’s capabilities and intentions, Robert
Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts approach the same issues with
significantly more critical objectivity in China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment. The result is a provocative, at times alarming, but
quite balanced discussion of several alternative futures for China’s strategic arsenal and nuclear doctrine, and for U.S. policy. This short volume is the first product of a series of roundtable discussions among senior China analysts, national
security specialists, and nuclear experts. The authors state, however, that this
book represents not a consensus among the entire group but rather their own
preliminary assessment. Manning is a former Asia policy analyst at the State Department for the George H. W. Bush administration; he is now the director of
Asian studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Montaperto, a China expert
who was formerly on the faculty of the National Defense University, is dean of
academics at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Roberts is an arms
control expert at the Institute for Defense Analyses. The three authors possess
sufficient scholarly expertise to make this book essential reading for anyone who
wishes to understand the basic context of China’s nuclear policy and the forces
that drive China’s nuclear decision making.
Rather than accept the Cox Report’s suspicions as fact, Manning, Montaperto,
and Roberts begin with what little we do know about China’s strategic weapons,
delivery systems, fissile material stockpiles, and nuclear doctrine. They use this
sketch of current and potential capabilities to posit five notional-force futures
for China’s strategic arsenal. Drawing from analyses at both ends of the spectrum regarding PLA capabilities, as well as best and worst-case assessments of
Chinese intentions, these scenarios run the gamut from minimum deterrence to
parity with the United States. Perhaps of more significance, however, is the authors’ discussion of how Chinese decisions on force structure and doctrine
might be influenced by a variety of factors. While internal forces like interservice
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competition for resources, changes in regime, and economic growth will inform
Chinese actions, and international trends, such as South Asian proliferation and
Japan’s changing security posture, will influence China’s nuclear planning, the
authors contend that it is the American approach to nuclear weapons in general
and to China specifically that will have the greatest impact on Beijing. This
prospect bodes well for the ability of the United States to exercise influence over
China’s nuclear arsenal, but it also demands a significant reorganization in U.S.
nuclear policy, which would include a linkage between nuclear policy, China
policy, and planning for both theater missile defense and national missile defense. According to the authors, the decisions that the Bush administration
makes regarding the scale and deployment of missile defenses will undoubtedly
have a significant influence on China’s nuclear doctrine.
From Beijing’s point of view, the prospect of a U.S. national missile defense
system implies the prospect of living in a world in which Washington can dictate
terms to China anywhere and everywhere that Washington has interests, be it in
the service of Taiwanese independence or human rights in Tibet.
While these statements are likely to raise calls from critics like Timperlake
and Triplett that the authors are sympathetic to Beijing, such considerations are
critical to shattering what the three authors view as the dominant “bipolar” paradigm of U.S. nuclear policy, which is fixated on U.S.-Russian relations, and to
building a new, more nuanced approach that takes second-tier nuclear powers
like China seriously. Likewise, U.S. policy choices may influence China’s willingness to participate in and abide by international arms control regimes.
Finally, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control makes the rarely heard argument that policy makers in Washington must address the role that Russia will
play in the Sino-U.S. equation. Russia currently occupies the second spot in
China’s hierarchy of bilateral relationships, after the United States, and this dynamic must be incorporated into a new “tripolar paradigm for nuclear arms
control.” The intersection of these three powers, the authors argue, is what
should drive an entirely new American approach to nuclear policy and to discussions with China on nuclear issues. This approach will require combining the issues of nuclear weapons, missile defense, and China in a wider U.S. national
debate and within U.S. security institutions. This could in turn lead to a more
constructive dialogue with both Russia and China, and maximize the ability of
the United States to influence Chinese policy choices for the better. While I do
not share the authors’ optimism about positively influencing either Chinese decision making or Chinese impressions of America, I do find their ultimate prescriptions for a new nuclear policy framework to be persuasive.
The major shortcoming of China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control is its
frustrating brevity. To be fair, this is more the result of the paucity of reliable
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open-source material and secondary works on China’s strategic forces and doctrine, as compared to the abundant material on both the PLA’s conventional
forces and its emerging information warfare doctrine. While Timperlake and
Triplett rely primarily on speculation “to accurately chronicle” China’s rise,
neglecting readily available open-source material, Manning, Montaperto, and
Roberts are forced to speculate, because the relevant material does not yet exist.
However, given the prolific publishing records of all three authors, we can anticipate more detailed works to follow that will flesh out this preliminary assessment. A secondary weakness of the book is its lack of a bibliography. While the
footnotes are a useful reference for further reading, a full bibliography of relevant primary and secondary sources, perhaps even annotated by the knowledgeable authors, would have been invaluable. Yet even with these flaws, the
book is a concise, scholarly, and balanced assessment of a topic that is critical to
U.S. national security.
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